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NATURE OF Tlffi CASE
This action was filed by Appellant David E. Sheley (Sheley)
against Respondent Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch)
on a claim of fraud perpetuated by Merrill Lynch employee Robert G. Oyler (Oyler)
against Sheley. Merrill Lynch filed a Third Party Compaint against Oyler on the
basis that if Merrill Lynch was liable to Sheley, Oyler was in turn liable therefor
to Merrill Lynch. The fraud claim arose out of the purchase by Sheley of two
$1,000.00 bonds in a company known as Concepts International.
-1-

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial to the court, the Honorable Calvin Gould, sitting without
a j u r y , resolved the issues against Sheley and in favor of Merrill Lynch.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Sheley asks reversal of Judge Gould1 s decision, and judgment as
a matter of law for either recission or a money judgment against Merrill Lynch for
$2,000.00. Merrill Lynch seeks affirmance of the trial court decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
r

,

n

'•")• ». The Trial Court resolved disputed facts against Sheley, accordingly

such facts should be presented to this Court in the light most favorable to Merrill
Lynch.
The bare bones of the transaction are not in dispute. Sheley went to
Merrill Lynch to see Oyler, an employee of Merrill Lynch, upon recommendation of
a friend (R-91). If Oyler had worked at a firm other than Merrill Lynch, Sheley
would have gone to the other firm instead of Merrill Lynch (R-119). In June of
1973, Sheley purchased some $5,000.00 worth of two stocks, Pacific Power and Light
and Bank America Real Estate (R-93,94) . Pacific was then on the Merrill Lynch
recommended list, Bank America was not (R-150). Sheley paid for the stocks by
two personal checks he wrote payable to Merrill Lynch (R-99,114).
In September of 1973, after a short visit with Oyler, Sheley sold the
Pacific stock for $2,400.00 earning a profit of some $400.00 (R-112). At this time
he also purchased two $1,000.00 bonds from a company called Concepts International
(Concepts) (R-98). Sheley paid for these bonds with a check (Ex A) he made
payable not to Merrill Lynch, but to Concepts. The check was drawn by Sheley

on a joint account with his wife, Noreen, and the proceeds of the Pacific sale
(joint funds with Noreen) were used to cover the check (R-116).
Sheley has never made demand for delivery of the bonds from Concepts,
and in fact has refused to accept them despite attempted delivery (R-143) . Concepts
is a Utah corporation in good standing both at time of sale and time of trial. It
operates a business, has assets, employees, and has paid interest on its bonds.
(R-146, 147).
Merrill Lynch had obtained from Oyler, as part of its management policy,
an affidavit disclaiming any outside interests (R-137). The first information
Merrill Lynch received of Oyler T s involvement with Concepts was after Oyler T s
termination of employment (R-125). Additional facts, as they apply to specific
i s s u e s , will be set out in the argument on those issues,
POINT

ONE

OYLER WAS NOT THE AGENT OF MERRILL LYNCH IN THE
SALE TO SHELEY OF CONCEPTS BONDS
It is undisputed, and conceded by Sheley, that Oyler had no authority
from Merrill Lynch to sell Sheley the Concepts bonds. Similiarly, Merrill Lynch
had no authority from Concepts International to sell such bonds. The transaction
was never entered on Merrill Lynch books, and Merrill Lynch received no consideration of any nature from the sale. Merrill Lynch was unaware of Oyler T s activity
until long after the transaction was completed. (R-125). The trial court found
Sheley was not the agent of Merrill Lynch in fact or in law (R-66) with regard to
this purchase •
There are several Utah cases dealing with the liability of the employer
for torts of the employee. Barney v Jewel Tea, 104 U. 292, 139P2d878, (1943)
-3-

was a suit arising out of a battery committed by an agent employed to sell
merchandise and collect accounts. In holding the employer not liable, this
Court said:

:

,

>

,/:

v

r

"We believe the better rule to be that a principal is not liable
for the willful tort of an agent which is comitted during the
course of his employment unless it is committed in the furtherance of his employer's interests or unless the employment
is such that the use of force could be contemplated in its
accomplishment."

A similiar result obtained in Sweatman v Linton, 1925, 66 U. 208, 241 P. 309:
"The general rule stating under what circumstances a principal,
such as the packing company in this case, is answerable for the
acts of its agents, is clearly stated in the second headnote to
Pressley v Mobile & G. R. Co. (C. C.) 15 F . 199, as follows:

iii

"If an agent, while acting within the range of his employment,
does an act injurious to another, either through negligence,
wantonness, or intention, then for such abuse of the authority
conferred upon him or implied in his appointment the master or
employer is responsible in damages to the person thus injured;
but if the agent go beyond the range of his employment or duties,
and of his own will does an unlawful act injurious to another, the
agent is liable, but the master or employer is not."

The Sweatman case was relied upon in the 10th Circuit case of Oman v . United
States, 1949, 179 F2d 738:

i

"A principal is liable civilly for the tortious acts of his agent which
are done within the course and scope of the agent T s employment or
agency, even though the principal did not authorize, ratify, participate in, or know of such misconduct. But, a principal i^not liable
to third persons for torts committed by his agent acting outside the
scope of hij3 employment. If the agent goes outside his employment
and acts not in furtherance of the principal's business, but to effect
some purpose of his own, the principal is not liable." (Emphasis added).
R & B Supply Co. v Bringhurst, 1972, 28U2nd, 442, 503 P2nd 1216,
reviewed the apparent authority of an agent receiving goods to sign an invoice
binding the principal to the payment of collection and attorneys fees. This court
-4-

held the agent had no such implied or apparent authority.
•:. , n

>

Sheley relies in chief upon three cases in his brief on the agency

question. The first, Clothier v Beane, Okla. 1940, 105 P2d 752 is of no assistance. In that case the customers man clearly had actual authority to answer the
buyers inquiries on Chrysler stock. In doing so, he made an e r r o r , and of
course the principal was responsible to the customer for such error made in the
course of employment.
The second, Andrews v Seidner, Cal. App. 1942, 121 P2d 863 involved
an assault by the employee of a beer hall. The result was controlled by a specific
California statute, and is contrary to the Utah law as set out in Jewel Tea, supra.
The third case, Lewis v Walston & Co. I n c . , 5th C C A . 1973, 487
F 2d 617 is distinguishable in two critical areas:
-

f

•;• .^

In Walston, the customers were long time clients of the brokerage

firm itself. In contrast, Sheley had no dealings with Merrill Lynch other than the
one previous transaction with Oyler. In fact, but for Oyler, Sheley would not have
gone to Merrill Lynch at all.
-

c

In Walston, the manager of the brokerage was well aware, prior

to the sales, of the activities of the agent in soliciting the sales. The manager had
even talked with the plaintiffs (prior to the sale) about the proposed transactions,
but took no action to prevent it and did not in any way warn the customer it was
not an authorized sale. To the contrary, the evidence in Walston was to the effect
that the brokerage often dealt with established customers on issues not regularly
handled by the brokerage. No such evidence was here offered.
Two recent cases support the position of Merrill Lynch. Glendale

Realty v Johnson, Wash. App. 1972, 495 P2d 1375 involved a fraud action for
misrepresentation against a real estate company and its sales agent. The agent
was found liable for the fraud, the company was not because the agent had no authority
to so act.

» ' ..
Schuette v Winternitz, Colo. App. 1972, 498 P2d 1183 holds that the

principal is not bound by the misrepresentation of his agent, made without the
p r i n c i p a l s knowledge, consent or authority. If the principal received some
benefit a consideration from the transaction induced by the agents fraud, recission
could be had against the principal. Since the principal did receive nothing, the
only available remedy was against the agent in damages.
•

In our case, Merrill Lynch received nothing. As opposed to furthering

the p r i n c i p a l s business, it is difficult to imagine what Oyler could have done that
would be more damaging. The key here may very well be Exhibit "A". Sheley
had, on previous transactions, issued two checks payable to Merrill Lynch. He
also received confirmations of those sales directly from Merrill Lynch. Now if
Exhibit TTATT was made payable to Merrill Lynch or to cash or b e a r e r , Sheley may
have some claim because he could argue Oyler had apparent authority to receive
payment for his principal. It is difficult to see any argument that Oyler had
apparent authority from Merrill Lynch to accept monies payable to Concepts.
The very fact that Oyler requested the check be payable to Concepts, together
with Sheley T s knowledge of the previous payments being made to Merrill Lynch,
must destroy (if it ever existed) any apparent or implied authority theory that
-6-

would enable Sheley to recover against Merrill Lynch. By making the check
payable to Concepts, Sheley acknowledged he was not dealing with Merrill Lynch,
and set the stage for what followed. In view of all the circumstances, we submit
that in fact and law Oyler was not Merrill Lynch T s agent in this transaction.
POINT

TWO

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION IN FRAUD
This suit, although it involves the sale of a security, is not a securities
action. It is not founded upon statutory or administrative disclosure requirements,
but is a garden variety common law action in fraud (R-l) . Fraud allegations must
be spelled out with particularity, 9(b) ,U. R.C . P . The burden is with Sheley to
prove all of the essential elements (9) of fraud by clear and convincing evidence,
Pace v Parrish, 1952, 122 U. 141, 247 P2d 273. For evidence to be clear and
convincing, it must be such there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion, Greener v Greener, 1949, 116 U. 571, 212 P2d 194.
The Trial Court (R-83) found Sheley wanting.
The nine (9) elements are:

^ :--:

.

, * >

1)

a representation;

2)

of a present existing material fact; ifrnuo B C ^

3)

falsity;

J

q\ ••riQ>" ; i : ^1=">VH.

:

JU^

iin'^vJ-

•••'• \

4) made with knowledge of falsity;
5)

to induce action;

6)

Plaintiff acting reasonably, and in ignorance of the falsity;

7)

Actual reliance;

8)

Action taken in reliance;
-7-

9)

damage resulting.

It is necessary to look at the transcript to see what evidence there
is to support the charge of fraud. The Concepts bonds were discussed by Sheley
and Oyler on only one occasion, September 26, at that meeting Sheley decided
to sell the Pacific stocks, and buy the Concepts bonds (R-110). Sheley denies
any misrepresentation or falsity induced him to sell Pacific ( R - l l l , 112):
Q

"Let me ask you t h i s , to your knowledge did he tell you anything
false about Pacific Power & Light that induced you to sell that stock?

A

Nothing false, it just wasn't doing as good as he thought it would b e . "

f< *;

Sheley was asked in direct (R-97, 108) and cross examination
(R-109, 110) to detail the representations he relied upon in making his
purchase. Sheley testified Oyler told him Concepts was a California - Utah business;
doing well; selling home cleaning and commercial rug cleaning equipment; would
be a good investment; a Mr. Glasmann had invested in the company; it had a big
display at the Utah State Fair (R- 97, 108, 109). Sheley further said (R-97):
Q

"Now at that time was there any discussion as to whether this
company was registered with Merrill Lynch or registered with
the New York Stock Exchange, or American Stock Exchange?

A

No, s i r . "

„.u -. >.„..\.w. ,a :..

On cross examination, Sheley admitted he had no information as to
whether in fact Mr. Glasmann had invested in Concepts; whether it had a display
at the fair or not; whether it had been doing business in California and Utah; that
he had no discussion with Oyler as to whether Concepts was an approved Merrill
Lynch security, or was on any recognized market exchange, or even whether it
had any market at all. Sheley then testified (R-110):
- 8 -

•

-

: . . - . . •

-

*../

Q

M

Now you told us in response to counsel 1 s questions and my
questions everything you can recall that he told you on the
T -• 26th of September regarding these bonds?

A

Yes, to the best of my — that I can remember, those things that
I have told you."

]:*

Independent of Sheley, no evidence of the falsity of any of these
claimed misrepresentations was offered. The two statements regarding Tdoing
wellT and Tgood investment can be no more than opinion, and not actionable.
Lewis v White, 1954, 2 U. 2d 101, 269 P2d 865. Beyond this however, there
wras no evidence that either statement was false when made.
Appellants Brief seems to recognize this deficit in proof. As nearly
as we can make out, the representations now claimed actionable are (App. Brief
page 12):
1. The investment in Concepts was in Sheley T s best interest. In fact
Sheley never attributed such a statement to Oyler. Even if it were
proved to have been said, it is again opinion, not fact.
2. The sale was being made through Merrill Lynch. Sheley acknowledged
(R-116) he knew he was buying the bonds from Concepts.
3. A^ representation of value was u n t r u e . No representation of value
was ever made to Sheley.
4. The payment directly to Concepts was the usual and ordinary way
to handle a Merrill Lynch transaction. Sheley never testified Oyler said
t h i s , merely that he (Sheley) assumed it. (R-115). Yet Sheley, in
two separate transactions three months earlier, knew they had been
handled just the opposite, by payment directly to Merrill Lynch.
:••

-

9

-

The Trial Court did not find Sheley to have relied to his detriment
on any false representations. Even though inexperienced, a person may not
accept unquestioningly any representations made to him. It is the duty of a
purchaser to make such investigations and inquiries as reasonable care would
dictate, Lewis v White, supra. Sheley knew that securities offering 12 per cent
r e t u r n , such as Concepts, were higher risk investments than lower return
securities (R-113). He knew this was a new, young company with no earnings
track record, and carried with it r i s k s , (R-140, 150) . He knew he was not dealing
with Merrill Lynch when he made the check payable to Concepts (R-116). Despite all of
t h i s , after a thirty minute visit he made this purchase with no further inquiries.
Certainly this does not show, clearly and convincingly, that Sheley acted reasonably
in the matter. He should not now be heard to complain against Merrill Lynch, which
was entirely innocent of any wrong doing or negligence.
POINTTHREE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED SHELEY FAILED
TO PROVE DAMAGE
The complaint (R-l) asked alternatively for recission or damages.
Since Merrill Lynch received nothing in the transaction, and was not a party to
it, recission was unavailable. Sheley T s only remedy is suit for damage, and
again, as damage is one of the essential elements for the fraud action, he must
prove this damage by clear and convincing evidence.
Kinnear v Prows, 1932, 81 U. 135, 16 P2d 1094 is a case very much
in point. Here a fraud action for damage was brought, claiming certain false
representations caused plaintiffs to accept stocks in two companies. Because
plaintiffs did not show what the value of the stock he received actually was
-10-

at the time of transfer, a nonsuit granted by the Trial court was affirmed by this
court:

tl

,

. , . , . . . . . . -lV)if

"The burden was on plaintiffs to show what, if any, value the
stock had, and, if they depended upon evidence of the actual
value of the property, they should have produced some evidence
of the reasonable market value or the actual value of the property
in its then condition..."
again, at page 139,
"There is no evidence whatever of the real or market value of this
stock at the time it was transferred to plaintiffs, or of the financial
condition of the company, and hence no evidence of injury or
damage by reason of such false representations. We cannot presume
the value to be less than represented because it might well be that
earnings of the corporation, if any, remained in the treasury or
were used to extend and develop the property and business of the
corporation, in which event the value of the stock might be equal
to or greater than as represented."
The identical problem exists in our case. Sheley offered no evidence
of value of the Concepts bonds. The Trial Court (R-83) found that damage was
not proved. No one offered an opinion of value of the bonds. While there was
no market for the bonds as such, they had value according to the one witness asked
that question, Oyler (R-146). No witness testified the bonds did not have value, or
were worth less than $1,000.00 each. No balance sheets or profit and loss statements were put into evidence. All the Trial Court knew about Concepts came
from Oyler, who testified a) Concepts is a Utah corporation in good standing (R-146);
b) Oyler was an employee of Concepts at the time of trial (R-128); c) In 1973,
Concepts was doing business in California, and had a sales distributor there (R-130);
d) Concepts markets a line of janitorial supplies and equipment, steam cleaners
for carpets (R-131); e) Oyler had no way of determining the net worth of
Concepts, other than through consultation with its accountant, who was not called
-11-

as a witness (R-132); f) The assets of the company were used to purchase
equipment, inventory, etc. (R-134); g) Concepts has a business office at '
3207 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah (R-145); h) Concepts has paid interest
on bonds since 1973 (R-148).
Based on the above, the Trial court had no alternative but to find
that Sheley had not met his burden of proof on damage. For the court to say the
bonds, instead of being worth $2,000.00, were actually worth only $1,000.00, or
$500.00, or any other figure would be nothing but speculation. The one fact
that stands out from the evidence is the bonds do have value. This Court, following
Kinnear v Prows, supra, may not presume that value less than Sheley paid for
them.
We submit that Sheley has here sued the wrong p a r t y .

Concepts

received his $2,000.00, not Merrill Lynch. If he wants to rescind the transaction,
he should seek to do so against Concepts, a going b u s i n e s s . This same issue
was faced by this court in Milliner v Fox, 1974, Utah, 529 P2d 806. That was a
case involving securities, where the purchaser claimed accountants and attorneys
had improperly caused him to purchase stock in Commercial Liquidation Inc. It
is similiar to our case because t h e r e , as h e r e , the defendant did not sell the
security to the plaintiff, but is claimed to have been responsible for the purchase
by the plaintiff:
'-

'*

"Defendants further claim that the plaintiffs have failed to
join an indispensable p a r t y . There is merit in that contention
inasmuch as the plaintiffs purchased the stock from Commercial
Liquidators, I n c . , as claimed by the allegations of the complaint.
Plaintiffs should seek to recover back from the seller rather than
from third parties unless the corporation has been dissolved or
is under some disability. The plaintiffs have failed to allege
any fact which would tend to show that the corporation is not

_19_

an indispensable party. The plaintiffs make general allegations
of fraud, but they failed to comply with Rule 9 ( b ) , U . R . C . P . "
CONCLUSION
We submit the Trial Court rulings were based on sound interpretations of the evidence and should not be disturbed. The judgment of the Trial
Court should be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
Olmstead, Stine & Campbell
2650 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Respondent
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